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INTRODUCTION 
vert permeation of racial bias has existed in our legal system for 
centuries. While we have made some progress, the vestiges of 
racial stereotypes still remain. One particularly shocking—and 
recent—example was the prosecutor’s statement in the United States 
Supreme Court Case Calhoun v. United States. In that case, the 
defendant, Calhoun, an African American, was arrested while in a car 
with two others who were attempting to buy drugs from an 
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undercover officer.1 During his trial for conspiracy, the prosecutor 
questioned Calhoun about his claim that he was unaware of his 
friends’ activities, stating “You’ve got African-Americans, you’ve got 
Hispanics, you’ve got a bag full of money. Does that tell you—a light 
bulb doesn’t go off in your head and say, This is a drug deal?”2 In 
response, the Court aptly noted that “[b]y suggesting that race should 
play a role in establishing a defendant’s criminal intent, the 
prosecutor . . . tapped a deep and sorry vein of racial prejudice that 
has run through the history of criminal justice in our Nation.”3 
Policymakers must always be conscious of that vein of prejudice—
even in enacting progressive reforms. I consider here how those 
implementing the marijuana initiatives in Washington and Colorado 
might do so. 
While racial profiling is a documented problem with law 
enforcement in general,4 the record is even more replete with 
examples of race-based profiling in the implementation of drug laws.5 
This practice has led to selective arrests and prosecution for petty 
drug crimes, in turn resulting in the systematic incarceration of people 
of color.6 
Scholars and citizens alike have registered their outcry against 
current drug policies. Some scholars, for example, assert that courts 
only care about providing symbolic equality to traditionally 
subordinated groups without addressing the substantive inequities 
they experience in the legal system.7 Others, notably Michelle 
Alexander, label the mass incarceration and veritable caste system 
resulting from biased enforcement of drug laws the “New Jim 
Crow.”8 
Regardless of the label, this pattern of subjugation is real, and may 
even worsen, if burgeoning reform efforts are not designed to 
ameliorate it. The recent modifications of drug laws in Colorado and 
	
1 Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136 (2013). 
2 Id. at 1136. 
3 Id. at 1137. 
4 Steven R. Morrison, Note, Will to Power, Will to Reality, and Racial Profiling: How 
the White Male Dominant Power Structure Creates Itself as Law Abiding Citizen Through 
the Creation of Black as Criminal, 2 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 63, 77–80 (2007). 
5 See generally Traci Schlesinger, The Cumulative Effects of Racial Disparity in 
Criminal Processing, 2007 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 261 (2007). 
6 Id.; see infra Part II. 
7 See, e.g., Paul Butler, One Hundred Years of Race and Crime, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1043, 1045 (2010). 
8 E.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 7 (2011). 
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Washington encapsulate this danger. Portions of the Washington 
statute,9 in particular, threaten to maintain the status quo and to 
perpetuate stereotypes of African Americans and Latinos. The states’ 
approaches to marijuana legalization signal that it is time now, more 
than ever, to reevaluate and restructure our current drug laws to 
prevent selective prosecution as well as the disproportionate 
incarceration of men and women of color. In reforming current laws, 
however, states must avoid incorporating terms and limitations that 
might trigger new forms of profiling. 
Part I of this Article proceeds by exposing the disproportionate 
impact of drug policies on men and women of color. Part II then 
discusses the recent laws in Washington and Colorado and their 
potential for perpetuating the prevailing practice of selective 
enforcement. Finally, Part III espouses cautionary principles for other 
states considering legalization. 
I 
THE STATUS QUO 
Laws motivated by moral dirigisme10 are not new. Such laws are 
enacted in great part in order to guide moral behaviors. Rules 
outlawing murder and theft, to a certain extent, are, along with drug 
laws, examples of such motivation.11 Drug laws, however, are 
particularly problematic because of their ineffectiveness, selective 
implementation, and the harm they cause to disadvantaged groups.12 
The numbers tell the story. African Americans account for 
approximately forty-three percent of persons convicted of drug 
felonies in state courts, compared to fifty-five percent for whites; for 
those admitted to state prisons with new convictions for drug 
offenses, the numbers are even more grim: African Americans 
account for more than half, while whites are only one-third.13 That is 
true despite the fact that numerous studies show that African 
	
9 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.50.101–.606 (West, Westlaw through 2013 
legislation). 
10 In an earlier article, I argue that drug prohibition causes more harm than good and 
that the high costs of prohibition are not justified. See generally Michèle Alexandre, Sex, 
Drugs, Rock & Roll and Moral Dirigisme: Toward a Reformation of Drug and 
Prostitution Regulations, 78 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 101 (2009). 
11 Id. 
12 Drug War Statistics, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-war   
-statistics (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
13 Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 257, 274 (2009). 
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Americans do not use or sell drugs at higher or appreciably higher 
rates than whites;14 some show, in fact, that they do so at lower 
rates.15 
Nowhere is this fact more evident than in the enforcement of laws 
regulating marijuana.16 These laws have had systematic and 
disproportionate effects on men and women of color in America with 
little change and intervention from the government.17 The 
privatization of prisons18 and monthly quotas for arrests19 have 
imposed added financial incentives and pressures on law 
enforcement. Furthermore, there is some support for the argument 
that these laws have helped create the same pattern of subjugation 
across the world.20 
The global regulatory framework created by the United States often 
puts local communities at risk despite obtaining very poor results 
from such regulations.21 Around the world, women and children are 
treated with automatic suspicion due to their provenance22 while drug 
trafficking networks move closer to communities in order to evade 
	
14 Alexander, supra note 8, at 13 n.25 (citing, for example, HOWARD N. SNYDER & 
MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 81 (2006), available at 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006 /downloads/NR2006.pdf; EELUM ARYA & IAN 
AUGARTEN, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, CRITICAL CONDITION: AFRICAN-
AMERICAN YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 15 tbl. 5, 19 (2008), available at 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/African AmericanBrief.pdf). 
15 Meghana Kakade et al., Adolescent Substance Use and Other Illegal Behaviors and 
Racial Disparities in Criminal Justice System Involvement: Findings from a US National 
Survey, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1307, 1307 (2012) (noting that a longitudinal survey of 
nationally-represented youths showed that “African American youths were more likely 
than Whites to have been arrested multiple times . . . . White youths, however, had higher 
rates of substance use than did African American youths). 
16 Id. 
17 See Alexander, supra note 8, at 9; Geneva Brown, The Wind Cries Mary—The 
Intersectionality of Race, Gender, and Reentry: Challenges for African-American Women, 
24 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 625, 629–32 (2010). 
18 Llewellyn Hinkes-Jones, Privatized Prisons: A Human Marketplace, L.A. REV. 
BOOKS (Jan. 10, 2013), http://lareviewofbooks.org/article.php?id=1302&fulltext=1. 
19 See Margot Adler, At “Stop-And-Frisk” Trial, Cops Describe Quota-Driven NYPD, 
NPR (Mar. 21, 2013, 5:01 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/03/21/174941454/at-stop-and     
-frisk-trial-cops-describe-quota-driven-nypd. 
20 See generally Maureen Norton-Hawk, Exporting Gender Injustice: The Impact of the 
U.S. War on Drugs on Ecuadorian Women, 18 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 133 (2010) 
(arguing that the increase in the number of women incarcerated for drug offenses in 
Ecuadorian prisons is related to the U.S. war on drugs). 
21 See generally Alexander, supra note 8; Butler, supra note 7; Fellner, supra note 13. 
22 See e.g., Solimar Santos, Comment, Unintended Consequences of United States’ 
Foreign Drug Policy in Bolivia, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 127 (2002). 
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detection.23 For example, people of color are scrutinized and routinely 
profiled when traveling due to fears that individuals traveling in and 
out of the United States might be serving as mules for drug lords. This 
stereotype persists despite evidence showing that drug smugglers are 
predominantly U.S. citizens and are often white.24 As the Center for 
Investigative Reporting (CIR) documented, “U.S. citizens comprise 
the overwhelming amount of drug-related arrests in recent years by 
the Border Patrol. They’re about 80 percent of the total.”25 The 
stereotypes prevalent in enforcement of domestic laws are, thus, 
duplicated in the immigration context. 
Furthermore, global restrictions imposed by drug laws have left 
communities vulnerable as drug traffickers move closer to residential 
areas in order to avoid detection. For instance, in 2012 the urban 
center of Medellin, Colombia—having finally distanced itself from 
the specter of Pablo Escobar’s cocaine empire—was overrun by the 
violent Caribbean criminal group, the Urabeños.26 Similarly, in urban 
America, drug gangs often run their operations in housing buildings 
and apartments, exposing children to great danger. 
Efforts to dismantle drug networks are ineffective because they are 
either based on stereotypes as to who fits a drug dealer’s profile,27 or 
only punish low-level criminals who deal in small amounts of 
drugs.28 For example, a study on the enforcement of marijuana laws 
in New York City found: 
 Most of the people arrested possessed only a small amount, 
usually a few grams in a marijuana “joint” or “blunt,” or in a small, 
plastic bag—a “nickel bag” ($5) or a “dime bag” ($10). 
	
23 Mexican Drug Cartels Move Deeper into US to Tighten Grip on Narcotics Market, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:45 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/01 
/mexican-drug-cartels-deeper-us; Elyssa Pachico, Sinaloa Cartel Expands Reach in Peru, 
Australia, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis 
/sinaloa-cartel-expands-reach-in-peru-australia. 
24 Robert Beckhusen, Drug Cartel Mules Are American as Apple Pie, Border Patrol 
Data Shows, WIRED (Mar. 27, 2013, 3:39 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013 
/03/citizen-smugglers/. 
25 Id. 
26 Elyssa Pachico, Urban Battle in Medellin as Outsider Drug Cartel Moves In, 
INSIGHT CRIME (June 28, 2012), http://www.insightcrime.com/investigations/urban-battle 
-in-medellin-as-outsider-drug-cartel-moves-in. 
27 Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial 
Disparities in the American Criminal Justice System, 39 CRIME & JUST. 273, 277 (2010). 
28 10 Facts About Marijuana, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org 
/drug-facts/10-facts-about-marijuana (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (“More than 800,000 
people are arrested for marijuana each year, the vast majority of them for simple 
possession.”). 
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 This huge number of arrests has not been distributed equally 
among the people of New York City. Most people arrested were 
younger than 26 years and 91% were males arrested primarily in 
less affluent neighborhoods in all five boroughs. 
 New York’s marijuana arrests have long been racially skewed, 
but because of the eleven-fold increase in arrests beginning in 1997, 
a great many more young Blacks and Latinos have been arrested 
than ever before in the city’s history.29 
Many economists have denounced this status quo not only as 
ineffective and a waste of local and federal resources, but also as 
biased.30 Further, the systematic imprisonment of African Americans 
and Latinos raises questions about criminal law’s ineptitude when it 
comes to the equitable enforcement of its laws. In the post civil rights 
legal construct, it has become obvious that one of the major problems 
with drug laws lies in the assumption of neutrality and color 
blindness. These deeply rooted assumptions make it even harder to 
successfully question the discretion afforded to law enforcement 
officials. 
Such discretion increases the likelihood of racially inequitable 
administration of the law.31 This idea is supported by the statistical 
dichotomy between prosecuted, non-white, urban drug users as 
compared to prosecuted, suburban, white drug users.32 
II 
USHERING IN A NEW WORLD ORDER? COLORADO AND WASHINGTON 
In a statute passed on January 1, 2013, Washington created a 
regulatory scheme whereby a state commission monitors the 
	
29 HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH PETERSON SMALL, N.Y.C. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE: RACIAL BIAS AND POLICE POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY, 
1997–2007, at 8 (2008), available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/MARIJUANA-ARREST  
-CRUSADE_Final.pdf. 
30 See generally Chris Doyle & Jennifer C. Smith, Crime and Drugs: An Economic 
Approach (Univ. of Warwick Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 477, 1997), available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/publications/crim 
drug.pdf. 
31 See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, No. 09-CR-259 (JG), slip op. at 4 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 30, 2010) (criticizing federal prosecutors’ decision to charge a street-level dealer 
with conspiracy, which carries a mandatory five-year minimum prison sentence). 
32 See generally Margaret E. Finzen, Note, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral 
Consequences of Incarceration and Their Effects in Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 299 (2005); Gary Ford, The New Jim Crow: Male and Female, 
South and North, From Cradle to Grave, Perception and Reality: Racial Disparity and 
Bias in America’s Criminal Justice System, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 324 (2010). 
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production and limited distribution of marijuana.33 The stated purpose 
of the new law is primarily to raise money and to establish financial 
structures for funds collected through the sale of the product.34 It is 
notable that the law’s goal is also to “stop treating adult marijuana use 
as a crime and try a new approach.”35 
However, history and experience have revealed that good 
intentions are not always sufficient. In fact, as critical race theory 
scholars have formulated, unequal structures are so ingrained in our 
institutions that there is always a risk of duplicating past injustices, 
even when the old problematic frameworks are discarded.36 
Trying to dismantle the old approach to marijuana, the Washington 
statute allows possession of a small amount of the drug by persons 
twenty-one and older.37 The act also responds to concerns with due 
process, right to privacy and overcriminalization.38 Accordingly, the 
law creates a scheme for the distribution of funds raised through the 
sale of marijuana.39 The act also alleviates abuse concerns by 
criminalizing both driving under the influence and distribution of the 
drug to minors.40 
Still, even under the framework established by the Washington 
statute, some of the same subjugating patterns ofcurrent drug laws 
risk being repeated, if not carefully avoided. More specifically, the 
Washington statute contains three problematic features: (1) 
consideration of criminal records when assessing an application for a 
processing or retail license, (2) disproportionate consequences 
resulting from refusal to take a breath test when stopped for suspicion 
of driving under the influence, and (3) juvenile conversion of 
misdemeanors to felonies. 
	
33 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.50.101–.609 (West, Westlaw through 2013 
legislation). 
34 2013 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 3, § 1(2), at 1 (West); see also § 69.50.530. 
35 Id. § 1 at 1. 
36 See generally Reginald Leamon Robinson, Human Agency, Negated Subjectivity, and 
White Structural Oppression: An Analysis of Critical Race Practice/Praxis, 53 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1361 (2004). 
37 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.331(1)(a). 
38 Id. §§ 69.50.304(d), .312(d)–(e), .334, .360-.366. 
39 Id. §§ 69.50.530, .540. 
40 Id. §§ 46.61.502(b)–(d), 69.50.406. 
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A. Discretion, Criminal Records, and Licenses 
Washington makes the grant of a license to process or operate a 
marijuana retail outlet contingent on a criminal background check.41 
In reviewing applications for licenses or in considering denial, 
suspension, or renewal of licenses, the state liquor control board 
overseeing the operation of legal marijuana in the state may consider 
any prior criminal record.42 Furthermore, 
[t]he state liquor control board may submit the criminal history 
record information check to the Washington state patrol and to the 
identification division of the federal bureau of investigation in order 
that these agencies may search their records for prior arrests and 
convictions of the individual or individuals who filled out the 
forms. The state liquor control board shall require fingerprinting of 
any applicant whose criminal history record information check is 
submitted to the federal bureau of investigation. . . . Subject to the 
provisions ofthis section, the state liquor control board may, in its 
discretion, grant or deny the renewal or license applied for. Denial 
may be based on, without limitation, the existence of chronic illegal 
activity documented.43 
It should be noted that, under the statute, the licensing board is 
required to give “substantial weight” to an incorporated “city, town, 
or county legislative authority” objecting to the grant of a license 
based upon “chronic criminal activity[;]”44 which is defined as: 
(a) a pervasive pattern of activity that threatens the public health, 
safety, and welfare of the city, town, or county including, but not 
limited to, open container violations, assaults, disturbances, 
disorderly conduct, or other criminal law violations, or as 
documented in crime statistics, police reports, emergency medical 
response data, calls for service, field data, or similar records of a 
law enforcement agency for the city, town, county, or any other 
municipal corporation or any state agency.45 
While a concern for behaviors affecting the general welfare should be 
a necessary part of the regulation, the inclusion of minor violations 
like open container violations creates a high risk of arbitrary and 
burdensome enforcement. 
What is more, the statute specifically provides failure to comply 
with child support as ground for adverse action by the board. The 
	
41 Id. § 69.50.331(1). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. § 69.50.331(9). 
45 Id. 
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statute specifically mandates that “[t]he state liquor control board 
shall immediately suspend the license of a person who has been 
certified . . . by the department of social and health services as a 
person who is not in compliance with a support order.”46 A child 
support compliance requirement could negatively impact traditionally 
disadvantaged groups seeking to maintain gainful employment under 
this statute. Statistics show a relationship between income, race, and 
inability to pay fines or financial obligations.47 In fact, in the current 
economic downturn, new reports have surfaced regarding an 
increased number of individuals being forced to jail due to their 
inability to pay small debts.48 
Washington’s law could potentially continue this negative trend. 
The summary punishment of someone in violation of a support order 
fails to consider the counterproductive nature of this measure: once 
the license is terminated, it seems that the individual would be even 
less likely to make the payments. Instead of an immediate 
termination, a better alternative would be to create a warning structure 
with notices and set deadlines for remedying the violation. This is all 
the more reasonable considering that the payment of support is not 
squarely related to the goals and purposes of the statute’s legalization 
framework. In fact, it arguably runs counter to the statute’s expressed 
purpose of establishing an efficient and equitable implementation of 
laws related to marijuana. 
B. Harsh Penalties for Refusing Breath Tests 
The other problematic feature of the act is the severe punishment 
levied against  an individual who refuses to take a breath test when 
stopped by law enforcement. The statute provides that, 
[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle within this state is 
deemed to have given consent . . . to a test or tests of his or her 
breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol 
concentration or presence of any drug in his or her breath or blood 
if arrested for any offense.49 
	
46 Id. § 69.50.331(2)(b). 
47 See generally Lenna Nepomnyaschy & Irwin Garkinkel, Child Support Enforcement 
and Fathers’ Contributions to Their Nonmarital Children, 84 SOC. SERVICE REV. 341 
(2010). 
48 See, e.g., Alain Sherter, As Economy Flails, Debtors’ Prisons Thrive, CBS NEWS 
(Apr. 4, 2013, 5:58 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505143_162-57577994/as           
-economy-flails-debtors-prisons-thrive/. 
49 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308(1). 
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This presumption of consent results in a one-year suspension of one’s 
license when one refuses to submit to a breath test.50 It should be 
noted that harsh consequences for one’s refusal to take a breath test 
are almost commonplace in the United States. Still the movement to 
reform drug laws should include specific efforts to dismantle 
inequitable laws and practices, not perpetuate them. The 
consequences of refusing a breath test become even more dire if it is 
determined that the person has refused a test before.51 Yet, an 
individual’s license is only suspended for ninety days if he or she 
consents to a test and it is determined that he or she is above the 
legally sanctioned limit.52 
The presumption of criminality from the exercise of one’s right 
against self-incrimination creates a catch-22 for anyone stopped by 
the police. On the one hand, refusal to submit to a breath test carries 
grave consequences that not only alienate someone’s ability to 
gainfully participate in society (revocation of a driver’s license often 
impacts one’s ability to get to work), but often leads to criminal 
procedures. On the other hand, one who feels targeted and a victim of 
racial profiling may not always trust that law enforcement will 
properly administer a breath test. As a result, the swift punishment 
incorporated in the statute for refusing that test creates a lose-lose 
scenario that risks perpetuating ongoing patterns of disproportionate 
and selective enforcement. 
C. Juvenile Conversion of Misdemeanors to Felonies 
In addition to the discretion provided to the state board for 
consideration of tangential issues like child support in maintaining 
licenses, the Washington statute’s onerous consequences for juveniles 
should serve as warning for other states. The statute converts the 
offense of driving under the influence (above the threshold amount 
allowed by the statute) from a misdemeanor to a Class C felony “if 
	
50 Id. § 46.20.308(2)(a). 
51 Id. § 46.20.3101(1)(a). 
52 Id. § 46.20.308(2) (“The officer shall inform the person of his or her right to refuse 
the breath or blood test, and of his or her right to have additional tests administered by any 
qualified person of his or her choosing as provided in RCW 46.61.506. The officer shall 
warn the driver, in substantially the following language, that: (a) If the driver refuses to 
take the test, the driver’s license, permit, or the privilege to drive will be revoked or denied 
for at least one year; and (b) If the driver refuses to take the test, the diver’s refusal to take 
the test may be used in a criminal trial; and (c) If the driver submits to the test, and the test 
is administered, the driver’s license, permit, or privilege to drive will be suspended, 
revoked, or denied for at least ninety days.”). 
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the person is a juvenile.”53 This harsh response to juvenile drug use 
suggests that, in this new regulatory framework, the school to prison 
pipeline will be reinforced rather than dismantled. Considering 
juveniles’ high recidivism rate once they are thrust into the penal 
system, alternative measures, such as drug treatment and focused care 
along with license suspension, would be more appropriate. 
III 
CAUTIONARY PRINCIPLES FOR OTHER STATES CONSIDERING 
LEGALIZATION 
The danger that the current status quo of targeted and selective 
enforcement will be duplicated remains present as more states 
consider legalization frameworks similar to Washington’s. It should 
be noted that, while Colorado’s statute is not yet as specific as 
Washington’s, it, too, contains a broad mandate that “[l]egitimate, 
taxpaying business people, and not criminal actors, will conduct sales 
of marijuana.”54 Residents of Colorado have an opportunity to push 
their legislators to define terms like “legitimate” and “criminal actors” 
equitably, to avoid patterns where people with past, unrelated 
criminal activities might be used as scapegoats and deprived of 
opportunities under the new regulatory system. After all, as 
Colorado’s statute so elegantly states, the reforms in these two states 
ostensibly took place “[i]n the interest of the efficient use of law 
enforcement resources [and] . . . and individual freedom.”55 As a 
result, the content of the statute needs to be narrowly tailored to 
achieve these goals. States considering a similar legalization 
framework to Washington and Colorado should also beware of the 
potential problems identified in this Article and draft their statutes 
accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
The new legalization framework for marijuana presents an 
opportunity to focus on rehabilitation by providing treatment rather 
than punishment for juveniles and by not prejudicing individuals with 
	
53 Id. § 46.61.502(6). 
54 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(b)(IV). 
55 Id. § 16(1)(a). 
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a criminal past. Most jurisdictions, with few exceptions,56 have not 
made rehabilitation a goal. Programs focusing on providing treatment 
and opportunity demonstrate that a rehabilitation-based model can be 
more fruitful than the status quo.57 Giving a chance to those with a 
criminal past, once their qualification to run a marijuana processing or 
retailing business is established, will go a long away to stop the cycle 
of exclusion they traditionally experience. 
It is in our societal interest not to duplicate traditional biases 
against those with criminal pasts in the burgeoning legalization 
structures. The number of African Americans and Latinos with a 
criminal past is so high that a legalization framework that does not 
focus on rehabilitation will do nothing more than maintain the status 
quo. This is particularly the case in states with large African 
American and Latino populations, like New York, Mississippi, and 
Maryland—where the disproportionate enforcement of drug laws 
have helped to deplete these communities’ capital. 
 
 
	
56 Mark A. R. Kleiman & Kelsey R. Hollander, Reducing Crime by Shrinking the 
Prison Headcount, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 89, 102–04 (2011) (citing an exception as 
HOPE: Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement). 
57 See Honorable Steven S. Alm, A New Continuum for Court Supervision, 91 OR. L. 
REV. 1181, 1186 (2003) (revealing that after a year in the HOPE program, drug-related 
probationers were “(1) fifty-five percent less likely to be arrested for a new crime; (2) 
fifty-three percent less likely to have their probation revoked; (3) seventy-two percent less 
likely to use drugs; and (4) sixty-one percent less likely to skip appointments with their 
probation officers”). 
